Abstract. We are given a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) where each vertex has a preference list ranking its neighbors: in particular, every a ∈ A ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference, whereas the preference lists of b ∈ B may contain ties. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M such that the number of vertices that prefer M to M exceeds the number of vertices that prefer M to M . We show that the problem of deciding whether G admits a popular matching or not is NP-hard. This is the case even when every b ∈ B either has a strict preference list or puts all its neighbors into a single tie. In contrast, we show that the problem becomes polynomially solvable in the case when each b ∈ B puts all its neighbors into a single tie. That is, all neighbors of b are tied in b's list and b desires to be matched to any of them. Our main result is an O(n 2 ) algorithm (where n = |A ∪ B|) for the popular matching problem in this model. Note that this model is quite different from the model where vertices in B have no preferences and do not care whether they are matched or not.
Introduction
We are given a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) where the vertices in A are called applicants and the vertices in B are called posts, and each vertex has a preference list ranking its neighbors in an order of preference. Here we assume that vertices in A have strict preferences while vertices in B are allowed to have ties in their preference lists. Thus each applicant ranks all posts that she finds interesting in a strict order of preference, while each post need not come up with a total order on all interested applicants -here applicants may get grouped together in terms of their suitability, thus equally competent applicants are tied together at the same rank.
Our goal is to compute a popular matching in G. The definition of popularity uses the notion of each vertex casting a "vote" for one matching versus another. A vertex v prefers matching M to matching M if either v is unmatched in M and matched in M or v is matched in both matchings and M (v) (v's partner in M ) is ranked better than M (v) in v's preference list. In an election between matchings M and M , each vertex v votes for the matching that it prefers or it abstains from voting if M and M are equally preferable to v. Let φ(M, M ) be the number of vertices that vote for M in an election between M and M . If φ(M , M ) > φ(M, M ), then we say M is more popular than M and denote it by M M ; else M M . Observe that popular matchings need not always exist. Consider an instance where A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } and B = {b 1 , b 2 , b 3 } and for i = 1, 2, 3, each a i has the same preference list which is b 1 followed by b 2 followed by b 3 while each b i ranks a 1 , a 2 , a 3 the same, i.e. a 1 , a 2 , a 3 are tied A preliminary version of this paper has appeared at ICALP 2015. Work done while visiting TIFR, supported by the Deutsche Telekom Stiftung.
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together in b i 's preference list (see bottom left instance in Fig. 1 ). It is easy to see that for any matching M here, there is another matching M such that M M , thus this instance admits no popular matching.
The popular matching problem is to determine if a given instance G = (A ∪ B, E) admits a popular matching or not, and if so, to compute one. This problem has been studied in the following two models.
-1-sided model: here it is only vertices in A that have preferences and cast votes; vertices in B are objects with no preferences or votes. -2-sided model: vertices on both sides have preferences and cast votes.
Popular matchings need not always exist in the 1-sided model and the problem of whether a given instance admits one or not can be solved efficiently using the characterization and algorithm from [1] . In the 2-sided model when all preference lists are strict, it can be shown that any stable matching is popular; thus a popular matching can be found in linear time using the Gale-Shapley algorithm. However when ties are allowed in preference lists on both sides, Biró, Irving, and Manlove [3] showed that the popular matching problem is NP-complete. In this paper we focus on the following variant: * it is only vertices in A that have preference lists ranking their neighbors, however vertices on both sides cast votes.
That is, vertices in B have no preference lists ranking their neighbors -however each b ∈ B desires to be matched to any of its neighbors. Thus in an election between two matchings, b abstains from voting if it is matched in both or unmatched in both, else it votes for the matching where it is matched. An intuitive understanding of such an instance is that A is a set of applicants and B is a set of tasks -while each applicant has a preference list over the tasks that she is interested in, each task just cares to be assigned to anyone who is interested in performing it.
For instance, each task is a building that seeks to have some guard assigned to it and it has no preferences over the identity of the guard. Another application is in the many-to-one popular matching problem where each b ∈ B also has a capacity cap(b) associated with it. Here we seek a popular matching that can match every b ∈ B to up to cap(b)-many neighbors and we need to devise natural and succinct rules to decide when b prefers one subset over another. A possible model is to say that b just cares to have enough partners in the matching and it does not care about the identities of these partners. That is, we say b prefers In this paper we deal with the one-to-one setting of the above problem, i.e. cap(b) = 1 for all b ∈ B. We will see in Section 2 that this problem is significantly different from the popular matching problem in the 1-sided model where vertices in B do not cast votes. We show the following results here, complementing our polynomial time algorithm in Theorem 1 with our hardness result in Theorem 2. Theorem 1. Let G = (A ∪ B, E) be a bipartite graph where each a ∈ A has a strict preference list while each b ∈ B puts all its neighbors into a single tie. The popular matching problem in G can be solved in O(n 2 ) time, where |A ∪ B| = n. Theorem 2. Let G = (A ∪ B, E) be a bipartite graph where each a ∈ A has a strict preference list while each b ∈ B either has a strict preference list or puts all its neighbors into a single tie. The popular matching problem in G is NP-complete.
Theorem 2 follows from a simple reduction from the (2,2)-e3-sat problem. The (2,2)-e3-sat problem takes as its input a Boolean formula I in CNF, where each clause contains three literals and every variable appears exactly twice in unnegated form and exactly twice in negated form in the clauses. The problem is to determine if I is satisfiable or not. This problem is NP-complete [2] and our reduction shows that the following version of the 2-sided popular matching problem in G = (A ∪ B, E) with 1-sided ties is NP-complete:
-every vertex in A has a strict preference list of length 2 or 4; -every vertex in B has either a strict preference list of length 2 or a single tie of length 2 or 3 as a preference list.
Note that our NP-hardness reduction needs B to have Ω(|B|) vertices with strict preference lists and Ω(|B|) vertices with single ties as their preference lists. Our algorithm that proves Theorem 1 performs a partition of the set B into three sets: the first set X is a subset of top posts and, roughly speaking, the second set Y consists of mid-level posts, while the third set Z consists of unwanted posts (see Fig. 2 ). Applicants get divided into two sets: the set of those with one or more neighbors in the set Z (call this set nbr(Z)) and the rest (this set is A \ nbr(Z)).
Our algorithm performs the partition of B into X, Y , and Z over several iterations. Initially X = F , where F is the set of top posts, Y = B \ F , and Z = ∅. In each iteration, certain top posts get demoted from X to Y and certain non-top posts get demoted from Y to Z. With new posts entering Z, we also have applicants moving from A \ nbr(Z) to nbr(Z). Using the partition X, Y, Z of B, we will build a graph H where each applicant keeps at most two edges: either to its most preferred post in X and also in Y or to its most preferred post in Z and also in Y . Some dummy posts may be included in Y .
We prove that G admits a popular matching if and only if H admits an A-complete matching, i.e. one that matches all vertices in A. We show that corresponding to any popular matching in G, there is a partition L 1 , L 2 , L 3 of B into top posts, mid-level posts, and unwanted posts such that X ⊇ L 1 and Z ⊆ L 3 , where X, Y, Z is the partition computed by our algorithm. This allows us to show that if H does not admit an A-complete matching, then G has no popular matching. In fact, not every popular matching in G becomes an A-complete matching in H (Section 3 has such an example). However it will be the case that if G admits popular matchings, then at least one of them becomes an A-complete matching in H.
Background. Popular matchings have been well-studied in the 1-sided model [1, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15] where only vertices of A have preferences and cast votes. Abraham et al. [1] gave efficient algorithms to determine if a given instance admits a popular matching or not -their algorithm also works when preference lists of vertices in A admit ties. The notions of least unpopular matchings [13] and popular mixed matchings [9] were also proposed to deal with instances that had no popular matchings.
Gärdenfors [5] , who introduced the notion of popular matchings, considered this problem in the domain of 2-sided preference lists. In any instance G = (A ∪ B, E) with 2-sided strict preference lists, a stable matching is actually a minimum size popular matching and efficient algorithms for computing a maximum size popular matching were given in [7, 8] .
Organization of the paper. Section 2 has preliminaries. Section 3 contains our algorithm and its proof of correctness. Section 4 shows our NP-hardness result. We conclude with some open problems.
Preliminaries
For any a ∈ A, let f (a) denote a's most desired, first choice post. Let F = {f (a) : a ∈ A} be the set of these top posts. We will refer to posts in F as f -posts and to those in B \ F as non-f -posts. For any a ∈ A, let r a be the rank of a's most preferred non-f -post in a's preference list; when all of a's neighbors are in F , we set r a = ∞. The following theorem characterizes popular matchings in the 1-sided voting model. Theorem 3 (from [1] ). Let G = (A ∪ B, E) be an instance of the 1-sided popular matching problem, where each a ∈ A has a strict preference list. Let M be any matching in G. M is popular if and only if the following two properties are satisfied:
(ii) M matches each applicant a to either f (a) or its neighbor of rank r a .
Thus the only applicants that may be left unmatched in a popular matching here are those a ∈ A that satisfy r a = ∞.
Let us consider the following example where A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } and B = {b 1 , b 2 , b 3 }: both a 1 and a 2 have the same preference list which is b 1 > b 2 (b 1 followed by b 2 ) while a 3 's preference list is b 1 > b 2 > b 3 (see the top left figure in Fig. 1 ). Assume first that only applicants cast votes. The only posts that any of a 1 , a 2 , a 3 can be matched to in a popular matching here are b 1 and b 2 . As there are three applicants and only two possible partners in a popular matching, there is no popular matching here. However in our 2-sided voting model, where posts also care about being matched and all neighbors are in a single tie, we have a popular matching {(a 1 , b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 ), (a 3 , b 3 )}. Note that b 3 is ranked third in a 3 's preference list, which is worse than r a 3 = 2, however such edges are permitted in popular matchings in our 2-sided model.
Consider the following example (see the middle figure in Fig. 1 ): A = {a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } and B = {b 0 , b 1 , b 2 , b 3 }; both a 1 and a 2 have the same preference list which is b 1 > b 2 while a 3 's preference list is b 1 > b 0 > b 2 and a 0 's preference list is b 0 > b 3 . There is again no popular matching here in the 1-sided model, however in our 2-sided voting model, we have a popular matching {(a 0 , b 3 ), (a 1 , b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 ), (a 3 , b 0 )}. Note that b 0 ∈ F and here it is matched to a 3 and f (a 3 ) = b 0 ; also a 3 is matched to its second ranked post: this is neither its top post nor its r a 3 -th ranked post (r a 3 = 3 here).
Thus popular matchings in our 2-sided voting model are quite different from the characterization given in Theorem 3 for popular matchings in the 1-sided model. Our algorithm (presented in Section 3) uses the following decomposition.
Dulmage-Mendelsohn decomposition [4] . Let M be a maximum matching in a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E). Using M , we can partition A ∪ B into three disjoint sets: a vertex v is even (similarly, odd ) if there is an even (resp., odd) length alternating path with respect to M from an unmatched vertex to v. Similarly, a vertex v is unreachable if there is no alternating path from an unmatched vertex to v. Denote by E, O, and U the sets of even, odd, and unreachable vertices, respectively. The following properties (proved in [6] ) will be used in our algorithm and analysis.
-E, O, and U are pairwise disjoint. Let M be any maximum matching in G and let E , O , and U be the sets of even, odd, and unreachable vertices with respect to M , respectively. Then E = E , O = O , and U = U . -Every maximum matching M matches all vertices in O ∪ U and has size |O| + |U|/2. In M , every vertex in O is matched with some vertex in E, and every vertex in U is matched with another vertex in U. -The graph G has no edge in E × (E ∪ U).
Finding popular matchings in a 2-sided voting model
The input is G = (A ∪ B, E) where each applicant a ∈ A has a strict preference list while each post b ∈ B has a single tie as its preference list. Our algorithm below builds a graph H using a partition X, Y, Z of B that is constructed in an iterative manner. Initialize X = F , Y = B \ F , and Z = ∅.
For any a ∈ A, recall that r a is the rank of a's most preferred non-f -post. For any U ⊆ B, let nbr(U ) (similarly, nbr H (U )) denote the set of neighbors in G (resp., in H) of the vertices in U . Note that our algorithm will maintain nbr H (X) ∩ nbr(Z) = ∅ by ensuring that nbr H (X) ⊆ A \ nbr(Z). (II) Every a ∈ nbr(Z) adds the edge (a, b) to H where b is a's most preferred post in the set Z.
(III) Add all posts in D = { (a) : a ∈ A and r a = ∞} to Y , where (a) is the dummy last resort post of applicant a. For every applicant a such that nbr({a}) ⊆ X, add the edge (a, (a)) to H.
Note that introducing dummy posts does not interfere with the voting for popular matchings because dummy posts do not vote -they are only present in the "helper" graph H constructed above and not in the popular matching instance G. For any applicant a, being matched to (a) is equivalent to a being left unmatched. Thus any matching M in H can be projected to a matching in G, by deleting all (a, (a)) edges from M and for convenience, we will refer to the resulting matching also as M .
The condition for exiting the While-loop ensures that all posts in Y , and hence all in X ∪ Y , are odd/unreachable in the subgraph of H with the set of posts restricted to real posts in X ∪ Y (i.e. the non-dummy ones). So starting with a maximum matching in this subgraph and augmenting it after adding the edges on posts in Z in phase (II) and the edges on dummy posts in phase (III), we get a maximum matching in H that matches all real posts in X ∪ Y . After the construction of H, our algorithm for the popular matching problem in G is given below.
-If H admits an A-complete matching, then return one that matches all real posts in X ∪ Y ; else output "G has no popular matching".
In the rest of this section, we prove the following theorem. Some examples. We present some examples here and describe how our algorithm builds the graph H on these examples. Let X i , Y i , Z i denote the sets X, Y, Z at the end of the i-th iteration of our algorithm and let H i denote the graph H in step 4 of the i-th iteration of our algorithm.
In the first example (top left of Fig. 1 ), we have A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } and B = {b 1 , b 2 , b 3 } and the preferences of applicants are denoted on the edges. By our initialization, we have X 0 = {b 1 }, Y 0 = {b 2 , b 3 }, and Z 0 = ∅. In step 4 of our first iteration, we identify b 3 as an even post in H 1 . So Y 1 = {b 2 } and Z 1 = {b 3 }. In the second iteration, a 3 ∈ nbr(Z 1 ) and so it has no edge to b 1 in H 2 . This is the last iteration of our algorithm. Our final graph H has the edge set
While the above example admits a popular matching, consider the graph in the bottom left of Fig. 1 . The first iteration of our algorithm is exactly the same on this graph as it was with the earlier graph. We have X 1 = {b 1 }, Y 1 = {b 2 }, and Z 1 = {b 3 }. However in the second iteration, all the applicants a 1 , a 2 , a 3 become elements of nbr(Z 1 ) and b 1 becomes an isolated vertex in step 2, so b 1 becomes an element of Y 2 . In step 4 of the second iteration, b 2 is identified as an even post in H 2 as it is isolated in H 2 . So Y 2 = {b 1 } and Z 2 = {b 2 , b 3 }. No demotions happen in the third iteration, which is the last iteration of our algorithm. Our final graph H has the edge set
Observe that H has no A-complete matching.
In the third example (middle of Fig. 1 ), we have A = {a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } and B = {b 0 , b 1 , b 2 , b 3 } and the preferences of applicants are again denoted on the edges. In step 4 of the first iteration of this algorithm, the post b 3 is identified as an even vertex in Y 0 and it becomes an element of Z 1 . So a 0 ∈ nbr(Z 1 ) and b 0 becomes isolated in step 2 of the second iteration. So b 0 becomes an element of Y 2 and this is the last iteration of our algorithm. Our final graph H has In the graph on the extreme right, both the red dotted and green dashed matchings are popular, however the matching {(a1, b1), (a2, b2), (a3, b3), (x1, y1), (x2, y2)} in their union is not popular.
The fourth example here (the rightmost graph in Fig. 1 ) is that of a graph G with several popular matchings. It is not the case that H contains all these matchings. At the end of our entire algorithm, we have X = {b 1 , y 1 }, Y = {b 2 }, and Z = {b 3 , y 2 , y 3 }. The graph H does not contain the edges (a 3 , b 1 ) and (x 1 , y 1 ) since a 3 and x 1 belong to nbr(Z). The subgraph H admits an A-complete
, (x 1 , y 2 )} and this is a popular matching in G.
, (x 2 , y 2 )}, which is another popular matching in G. In fact, any subgraph that contains both M and M would also contain the following A-complete matching {(
, (x 2 , y 2 )}, which is not popular.
Proof of Theorem 4: the sufficient part
We first show that if H admits an A-complete matching, then G admits a popular matching. We have already observed that if H admits an A-complete matching, then H has an A-complete matching M that matches all real posts in X ∪ Y .
A useful observation is that Z ⊆ B \ F . This is because in step 4 of the While-loop in our algorithm, all f -posts in Y are odd/unreachable in H as they are the only neighbors in H of applicants who regard them as f -posts.
We now assign edge labels in {±1} to all edges in G \ M : for an edge (a, b) in G \ M , if a prefers b to M (a), then we label this edge +1, else we label this −1. The label of (a, b) is basically a's vote for b vs M (a). Fig. 2 is helpful here. 
The set B gets partitioned into X, Y , and Z. We have nbrH (X) ∩ nbr(Z) = ∅. In the figure on the right, the horizontal edges belong to M . Only the edges of (
For any U ∈ {X, Y, Z}, let M (U ) ⊆ A be the set of applicants matched in M to posts in U . The following lemma is important.
Proof. Every edge of nbr(X) × X that is present in H is a top ranked edge. Since M belongs to H, the edges of M from nbr(X) × X are top ranked edges. Thus it is clear that every edge of G in
where the rank of b in a's preference list is ≤ r a (i.e. r a or better); on the other hand, every edge of nbr(Z) × Z that is present in the graph H is an edge (a, b ) where the rank of b in a's preference list is ≥ r a (because b ∈ B \ F ). Since M belongs to H, the edges of M from nbr(Y ) × Y are ranked better than the edges of nbr(Z) × Z. Thus every edge of
We now show that any edge labeled +1 has to be in either Fig. 2 ). Consider any edge (a, b) / ∈ M such that b ∈ U and a ∈ M (U ), where U ∈ {X, Y, Z}. It follows from the construction of the graph H that a vertex in nbr(U ) can be adjacent in H to only its most preferred post in U . Thus any edge (a, b) / ∈ M where b ∈ U and a ∈ M (U ) is ranked −1. We have already seen that all edges in M (X) × Y and in M (Y ) × Z are labeled −1. There are no edges in M (X) × Z since M (X) ⊆ A \ nbr(Z). Thus any edge labeled +1 has to be in either
Let M be any matching in G. The symmetric difference of M and M is denoted by M ⊕ M : this consists of alternating paths and alternating cycles -note that edges here alternate between M and M . Recall that last resort posts are not used in M (which is a matching in G) whereas last resort posts may be present in M (which is a matching in H).
Lemma 2. Consider M ⊕ M . The following three properties hold:
(i) in any alternating cycle in M ⊕ M , the number of edges that are labeled −1 is at least the number of edges that are labeled +1. (ii) in any alternating path in M ⊕ M , the number of edges that are labeled +1 is at most two plus the number of edges that are labeled −1; in case one of the endpoints of this path is a last resort post, then the number of edges labeled +1 is at most one plus the number of edges labeled −1. (iii) in any even length alternating path in M ⊕ M , the number of edges that are labeled −1 is at least the number of edges that are labeled +1; in case one of the endpoints of this path is a last resort post, then the number of edges labeled −1 is at least one plus the number of edges labeled +1.
Proof. Property (i). Let
If C contains no vertex of Z, then there cannot be two consecutive non-matching edges labeled +1 in C. That is, if (a i , b i+1 ) is labeled +1, then b i+1 ∈ X and there is no +1 edge incident on M (b i+1 ) = a i+1 , thus the non-matching edge incident on a i+1 in C has to be labeled −1. Hence the number of edges that are labeled −1 is at least the number of edges that are labeled +1. Suppose C contains a vertex of Z: let b i be such a vertex. There can be two consecutive nonmatching edges labeled +1 now: let b i -a i -b i+1 -a i+1 -b i+2 be such an alternating path within C, where both (a i , b i+1 ) and (a i+1 , b i+2 ) are labeled +1. Then b i ∈ Z, b i+1 ∈ Y , and b i+2 ∈ X. In the first place, there is no +1 edge incident on a i+2 and the crucial part is that there is no edge in G between a vertex in nbr H (X) and a vertex in Z. Thus once we reach a vertex a i+2 ∈ M (X), we have to see an edge labeled −1 and so as to reach a vertex in Z, we need to see at least two consecutive non-matching edges labeled −1. Thus it again follows that the number of edges that are labeled −1 is at least the number of edges that are labeled +1.
The same argument that was used in the proof of property (i) shows us that there can be at most two consecutive non-matching edges labeled +1 in ρ and once we traverse such an alternating path b i -a i -b i+1 -a i+1 -b i+2 in ρ (where b i has to be in Z), we are at a vertex b i+2 ∈ X. Thereafter we have to see at least two more non-matching edges labeled −1 than those labeled +1 to again reach a vertex in Z. Thus it follows that the difference between the number of edges that are labeled +1 and the number of edges that are labeled −1 is at most two.
In fact, for the difference between the number of edges that are labeled +1 and the number of edges that are labeled −1 to be exactly two, it has to be the case that b 0 is in Z. For, in case b 0 is in Y , then it is easy to see that the difference between the number of non-matching edges that are labeled +1 and the number of non-matching edges that are labeled −1 is at most one. Note that all last resort posts belong to Y . Thus when b 0 is a last resort post, then the number of edges labeled +1 in ρ is at most one plus the number of edges labeled −1.
Recall that M is A-complete, thus any even length alternating path with respect to M has to have vertices in B as its endpoints (since one of them is left unmatched in M ). Since b k is a post that is matched in M but not in M , it follows that b k ∈ Z (as all non-dummy posts in X ∪ Y are matched in M ). Now the argument is similar to the proof of property (ii). In order to maximize the difference between the number of edges labeled +1 and those labeled −1, we assumed that the starting vertex b 0 ∈ Z. For the final vertex b k to be in Z, it follows that the number of edges that are labeled −1 is at least the number of edges that are labeled +1. In particular, when b 0 is a last resort post, then the starting vertex is in Y and so the number of edges that are labeled −1 is at least one plus the number of edges that are labeled +1.
Lemma 3 uses the above lemma to show the popularity of M . This completes the proof that if H admits an A-complete matching then G admits a popular matching.
Proof. Recall that M is A-complete (where some of the posts used in M can be last resort posts). For any a ∈ A and any neighbor b of a such that b = M (a), let vote a (b, M (a)) be the label of the edge (a, b), which is a's vote for b vs M (a). Consider M ⊕ M . We will now investigate each component of M ⊕ M -being a cycle, an odd path or an even path -and show φ(M, M ) ≥ φ(M , M ) for each of them.
-For any alternating cycle C ∈ M ⊕ M , among the vertices of C, the difference between those who prefer M and those who prefer M is equal to (a,M (a))∈C vote a (M (a), M (a)). It follows from property (i) that this sum is at most 0. -Consider any odd length alternating path ρ ∈ M ⊕ M : its endpoints are an applicant a and a post b that are unmatched in M . Assume b is a non-dummy post. Then among the vertices of ρ that are matched in M , the difference between those who prefer M and those who prefer M is equal to (a,M (a))∈ρ vote a (M (a), M (a)). It follows from property (ii) that this sum is at most 2. The two vertices a and b prefer M to M as they are matched in M and unmatched in M , since a is unmatched in M . Thus summed over all vertices of ρ, the difference between those who prefer M and those who prefer M is again at most 0. Now suppose b is a dummy post. Then it follows from property (ii) that among the vertices of ρ that are matched in M , the difference between those who prefer M and those who prefer M is at most 1. The vertex a prefers M to M . Thus summed over all real vertices of ρ, the difference between those who prefer M and those who prefer M is again at most 0. -Consider any even length alternating path ρ ∈ M ⊕ M : its endpoints are a post b 0 that is unmatched in M and a post b k that is unmatched in M . Assume b 0 is a non-dummy post.
Then summed over all vertices of ρ (this includes b 0 who prefers M and b k who prefers M ), the difference between those who prefer M and those who prefer M is at least 0 (by property (iii)). Now suppose b 0 is a dummy post. Then summed over all real vertices of ρ that are matched in M , the difference between those who prefer M and those who prefer M is at least 1 (by property (iii)). Thus summed over all real vertices of ρ (this includes b k who prefers M ), the difference between those who prefer M and those who prefer M is at least 0.
All vertices whose partners in M and in M are different belong to some alternating path or cycle in M ⊕ M . Hence the difference between the number of vertices that prefer M and those that prefer M is non-negative. In other words,
Proof of Theorem 4: the necessary part
We now show the other side of Theorem 4. That is, if G admits a popular matching, then H admits an A-complete matching. Let M * be a popular matching in G. Lemma 4 will be useful to us.
Lemma 4. If (a, b) ∈ M * and b ∈ F , then b has rank better than r a in a's preference list.
Proof. Suppose (a, b) ∈ M * , where b ∈ F , and b has rank worse than r a in a's preference list. Note that the rank of b cannot be exactly r a since there is another post b / ∈ F that has rank r a in a's preference list. We know that
So suppose the post b is matched and let a 1 = M * (b ). If a 0 = a 1 , then consider the alternating cycle C = a 0 -b-a-b -a 0 ; the matching M * ⊕C makes a 0 and a swap their partners and both applicants prefer M * ⊕C to M * while nobody prefers M * to M * ⊕C. Thus M * ⊕C is more popular than M * . If a 0 = a 1 , then consider the alternating path ρ that promotes a 0 to its top post b and then M * (b) = a to a more preferred post b and finally, M * (b ) = a 1 to its top post f (a 1 ). The vertices M * (a 0 ) and M * (f (a 1 )) become unmatched in M * ⊕ ρ and so they prefer M * to M * ⊕ ρ while the three vertices a 0 , a, and a 1 prefer M * ⊕ ρ to M * . Every other vertex is indifferent between M * ⊕ ρ and M * . So M * ⊕ ρ is more popular than M * . Thus we have contradicted the popularity of M * in all the cases.
Analogous to Section 3.1, we label the edges of G \ M * by +1 or −1: the label of an edge (a, b) in G \ M * is the vote of a for b vs M * (a). In case a is not matched in M * , then vote(a, b) = +1 for any neighbor b of a. Due to the popularity of M * , the following two properties hold on these edge labels (otherwise M * ⊕ ρ M * ).
(i) There is no alternating path ρ such that the edge labels in ρ \ M * are +1, +1, +1, · · · , i.e. no three consecutive non-matching edges are labeled +1. (ii) There is no alternating path ρ where the edge labels in ρ \ M * are +1, +1, −1, +1, +1, · · · , i.e. no five consecutive non-matching edge labels add up to 4.
Based on the matching M * and the edge labels on
-Roughly speaking, L 3 consists of unwanted posts, so all posts that are unmatched in M * belong to L 3 . Similarly, posts like b 3 with a length-5 alternating path
incident on them, with both the non-matching edges labeled +1 (see Fig. 3 ) are in L 3 . 
, where both (M * (b3), b2) and (M * (b2), b1) are labeled +1.
More formally, we define the partition
We now add more posts to the sets L 1 , L 2 , L 3 as described below.
For each length-5 alternating path
and both (a 2 , b 1 ) and (a 3 , b 2 ) are marked +1, add b i to L i , for i = 1, 2, 3. 2. Now consider those b ∈ B that are matched in M * but b is not a part of any length-5 alternating path where both the non-matching edges are labeled +1. We repeat the following two steps till there are no more posts to be added to either L 2 or L 3 via these rules:
Lemma 5. Recall that F is the set of top posts. The above partition L 1 , L 2 , L 3 satisfies the following properties:
Proof. Suppose b 1 = f (a 0 ) belongs to L 3 . The post b 1 has to be matched in M * . Let a 1 = M * (b 1 ) and we also know from the construction of the set L 3 that there is an edge (a 1 , b 2 ) with b 2 ∈ L 2 that is labeled +1. If the vertex a 0 is unmatched in M * , then by promoting a 0 to b 1 and a 1 to b 2 , and leaving M * (b 2 ) unmatched, we obtain a matching that is more popular than M * .
Hence let us assume that a 0 is matched in M * . Consider the alternating path M * (a 0 )-a 0 -b 1 -a 1 -b 2 with respect to M * : this has two consecutive non-matching edges that are labeled +1. Thus it follows from our construction of
and b 2 ∈ L 1 . This contradicts our assumption that b 1 ∈ L 3 . This finishes the proof of (1).
We first state the following claim, which will be used in the proof of (2). We will assume Claim 1 and finish the proof of (2) and then prove this claim.
Claim 1 If a ∈ nbr(L 3 ) and M * (a) = f (a), then there is an alternating path ρ a with respect to M * with a as an endpoint such that either ρ a is even and the edge labels on ρ a \ M * are −1, +1, −1, · · · , +1, +1 or ρ a is odd and the edge labels on ρ a \ M * are −1, +1, −1, · · · , +1, −1 where the last edge is incident on an unmatched post.
It is easy to see that M * ⊕ p is more popular than M * : a contradiction to the popularity of M * .
In case a 2 appears in ρ a 1 , then we have an alternating cycle C, which is ρ a 1 truncated till the vertex a 2 followed by a 2 -b 1 -a 1 . This cycle has a stretch of alternating −1 and +1 labeled nonmatching edges along with two consecutive non-matching edges labeled +1: these are the edge (a 2 , b 1 ) and the edge incident on b 2 in ρ a 1 from a vertex in M * (L 3 ). Thus M * ⊕ C is more popular than M * : a contradiction again. If a 3 appears in ρ a 1 , then we can again construct an alternating cycle C (using the a 1 ; a 3 subpath of ρ a 1 followed by the alternating path p). The matching M * ⊕ C is more popular than M * since C has more +1 labeled non-matching edges than −1 labeled non-matching edges. This again contradicts the popularity of M * .
Regarding posts added to L 1 in step 3, we add any post b to L 1 only after checking that
Proof of Claim 1. Posts are added to L 3 in steps 1, 2 and 3. We now study each of these cases. The set L 3 was initialized to the set of posts left unmatched in M * . So at the end of step 0, it is the case that every a ∈ nbr(L 3 ) has an odd alternating path, which is in fact an edge (a, b) labeled −1, whose one endpoint is a and the other endpoint is an unmatched post b. Let b 3 be a post that got added to L 3 in step 1. Then there is an alternating path
, and both (a 3 , b 2 ) and (a 2 , b 1 ) are marked +1. Thus every neighbor a ∈ nbr({b 3 }) with M * (a) = f (a) has an even length alternating path ρ a = a-b 3 -a 3 -b 2 -a 2 -b 1 -a 1 where the edge labels on ρ a \ M * are −1, +1, +1 . Note that a = a 1 -otherwise ρ a is an alternating cycle and M * ⊕ ρ a is more popular than M * .
Thus the claim that every a ∈ nbr(L 3 ) with M * (a) = f (a) has a desired alternating path ρ a is true at the end of step 1. Let b 3 be a post that got added to L 3 in step 2 and let us assume that till the point b 3 gets added to L 3 , the claim holds. Since b 3 was added to L 3 in step 2, this was due to a +1 edge between a 3 = M * (b 3 ) and a post b 2 ∈ L 2 whose partner a 2 = M * (b 2 ) regards b 2 as a top post. The post b 2 ∈ L 2 because its partner a 2 ∈ nbr(L 3 ). This means there is a desired alternating path ρ a 2 incident on a 2 . Neither b 3 nor b 2 lies on ρ a 2 since all the posts in ρ a 2 that belong to L 2 ∪ L 3 were added to L 2 ∪ L 3 prior to b 2 joining L 2 and b 3 joining L 3 . Consider any neighbor a of b 3 that is in nbr(L 3 ) because b 3 ∈ L 3 and M * (a) = f (a). The desired alternating path ρ a is a-b 3 -a 3 -b 2 -a 2 followed by ρ a 2 .
We will use the partition L 1 , L 2 , L 3 of B to build the following subgraph G = (A ∪ B, E ) of G. For each a ∈ A, include the following edges in E :
∈ nbr(L 3 ), then add the edge (a, f (a)) to E . (ii) if a has a neighbor of rank ≤ r a in L 2 , then add the edge (a, b) to E , where b is a's most preferred neighbor in L 2 . (iii) if a ∈ nbr(L 3 ), then add the edge (a, b) to E , where b is a's most preferred neighbor in L 3 .
Lemma 6. Every edge of the matching M * belongs to the graph G .
Proof. The set B has been partitioned into L 1 ∪ L 2 ∪ L 3 . We will now show that for each post b 0 that is matched in M * , the edge (M * (b 0 ), b 0 ) belongs to G . We distinguish three cases:
-Case 1. The post b 0 ∈ L 1 . Hence there is no +1 edge incident on a 0 = M * (b 0 ), in other words,
hence a 0 has no neighbor in L 3 and by rule (i) above, the edge (a 0 , f (a 0 )) = (a 0 , b 0 ) belongs to the edge set of G . ∈ F , then b 0 has to be a 0 's most preferred post outside F , i.e. b 0 has rank r a 0 in a 0 's preference list.
-Case 3. We finally consider the case when the post b 0 ∈ L 3 . We need to show that b 0 is the most preferred post of The following lemma shows the relationship between the partition L 1 , L 2 , L 3 and the partition X, Y, Z constructed by our algorithm that builds the graph H.
Lemma 7.
The set X ⊇ L 1 and the set Z ⊆ L 3 .
Proof. In our algorithm that constructs the graph H and the partition X, Y, Z , the set X is initialized to F and the set Y is initialized to B \ F . As our algorithm progresses, in each iteration of the While-loop, some f -posts get demoted from X to Y and similarly, some non-f -posts get demoted from Y to Z till there is an iteration (say, iteration h + 1) where all posts in Y are odd/unreachable in H -this is the last iteration of the While-loop.
For any 1 ≤ k ≤ h + 1, let T k (similarly, F k ) be the set of posts that got demoted from Y to Z (resp., X to Y ) in the k-th iteration of the While-loop in our algorithm. We have T h+1 = ∅.
Note that F 1 = ∅ since Z is initialized to ∅, so in the first iteration of our algorithm, every f -post b has a neighbor a ∈ A \ nbr(Z) such that f (a) = b. Thus no post is demoted from X to Y in the first iteration.
The graph H 1 is the subgraph of G where each a ∈ A has at most two neighbors: its top post and when r a < ∞, its neighbor of rank r a . Let S be the set of posts in B \ F that are odd/unreachable in the graph H 1 . The set T 1 is the set of even non-f -posts in H 1 , i.e. T 1 = B \ (F ∪ S).
We will use the following claims and finish the proof of this lemma (the proofs of Claims 2-4 are given after the proof of Lemma 7).
Claim 4 For any
Claim 2 tells us that T 1 ⊆ L 3 . We now use Claims 3 and 4 alternately to conclude that for every
Proof of Claim 2. Any post in T 1 that is left unmatched in M * has to belong to L 3 . Similarly, any b 0 ∈ T 1 that is matched to an applicant a 0 that ranks b 0 worse than r a 0 has to belong to L 3 : this is because there is a length-5 alternating path p = b 0 -a 0 -b 1 -a 1 -b 2 -a 2 where b 1 is a post of rank r a 0 in a 0 's preference list, a 1 = M * (b 1 ), and b 2 = f (a 1 ). The path p has two consecutive non-matching edges that are labeled +1, so b 0 ∈ L 3 . Now consider any b 0 ∈ T 1 that is matched in M * to an applicant a 0 such that the rank of (a 0 , b 0 ) is r a 0 . So a 0 is a neighbor of b 0 in H 1 . Since b 0 is even in H 1 , all the neighbors of b 0 in H 1 are odd and thus they have to be of degree exactly 2 in H 1 (recall that all applicants have degree at most 2 in H 1 ). Thus the neighbors of these applicants are again even. Let C be the connected component containing b 0 in H 1 . It is easy to see that in C, all posts are even, all applicants are odd, and the number of posts is more than the number of applicants. (In fact, C is a tree with b 0 as the root and the number of posts in C is one plus the number of applicants in C.)
If b 0 ∈ L 2 , then a 0 's other neighbor in C, which is f (a 0 ), has to be in L 1 since there is a +1 edge from a 0 to f (a 0 ). This means f (a 0 ) is matched to an applicant a 0 that ranks it as a top post, so the applicant a 0 is a neighbor of f (a 0 ) in C. There has to be another neighbor of a 0 in C, call this b 1 . The important observation is that b 1 cannot be in L 3 as that would violate Lemma 5.2 since a 0 ∈ M * (L 1 ). So b 1 ∈ L 2 and this means b 1 is matched to an applicant a 1 that ranks it r a 1 , in other words, a 1 is a neighbor of b 1 in C. So f (a 1 ) has to be in L 1 and we continue in this manner marking all f -posts in C as elements of L 1 and all non-f -posts in C as elements of L 2 .
This means all posts in C are matched to their neighbors in C, however this is not possible as there are more posts than applicants in C. This contradicts our assumption that b 0 ∈ L 2 , in other words, b 0 has to be in
Proof of Claim 3. The set F k+1 is the set of posts that got demoted from X to Y in the (k + 1)-th iteration of the While-loop: this means each post b in F k+1 had no applicant outside nbr(∪ k i=1 T i ) that regarded b as an f -post. In other words, every applicant a such that f (a) = b belongs to
Proof of Claim 4. Let us assume that we have proved Claim 4 for all smaller values of k. That is,
. This is indeed the case for k = 2 since we know T 1 ⊆ L 3 (by Claim 2). Using Claim 3 and Claim 4 (for
Let H k denote the graph H in step 4 in the k-th iteration of the While-loop in our algorithm. This is the graph where we determine the even posts that will get demoted from Y to Z. In step 4 of the k-th iteration of the While-loop, the set
, and let Y k be the set of posts outside X k ∪ Z k . The edge set of H k is as follows: -for each a ∈ A: if the rank of a's most preferred post b in Y k is ≤ r a , then the edge (a, b) belongs to H k -for a ∈ A \ nbr(Z k ): the edge (a, f (a)) is also present in H k .
Let us refer to posts in S as s-posts: recall that these are odd/unreachable non-f -posts in the graph H 1 . We will now show that all s-posts in L 2 are odd/unreachable in H k ; so every s-post that is even in H k has to be in L 3 , in other words, T k ⊆ L 3 . Let G 0 be the subgraph of G with the set of posts restricted to L 1 ∪ L 2 (see Fig. 4) . Consider the subgraph G k of G 0 obtained by deleting edges missing in H k from G 0 .
We now show that G k contains all edges in G 0 incident on s-posts in L 2 . This is because any edge (a, b) incident on an s-post b ∈ L 2 in G 0 is present in H k also. Since the edge (a, b) belongs to G 0 , the post b has to be ranked r a in a's preference list and there is no f -post in L 2 of rank better than r a in a's list. If the edge (a, b) does not exist in H k , then it means there is some f -post in Y k that a prefers to b. All f -posts in Y k are in ∪ k i=2 F i and we are given that ∪ k i=2 F i ⊆ L 2 . Since we know there is no f -post in L 2 that a prefers to b, it follows that b has to be a's most preferred post in Y k and so the edge (a, b) belongs to H k . Thus G k , whose edge set is the intersection of the edge sets of G 0 and H k , contains all edges in G 0 incident on s-posts in L 2 .
Every post in L 1 ∪ L 2 is odd/unreachable in G 0 since the matching M * restricted to the edge set of G 0 is (L 1 ∪ L 2 )-complete. We have shown that G k contains all edges in G 0 incident on s-posts in L 2 : thus all s-posts in L 2 are odd/unreachable in G k . It is easy to see that all top-ranked edges 
We now claim that all posts in L 1 are also odd/unreachable in G k . We first show that all edges incident on
either has a degree 1 neighbor (in which case our claim is true) or it has a degree 2 neighbor a whose other neighbor is in Y k ∩ L 2 , i.e. it is not in X k ∩ L 2 . This is because a cannot have 2 neighbors in X k in the graph H k and we know L 1 ⊆ X k since all f -posts missing in X k (these are posts in ∪ k−1 i=2 F i ) are absent from L 1 also. Since all posts in Y k ∩ L 2 are odd/unreachable in G k , it follows that all posts in L 1 are also odd/unreachable in G k .
Let us now compare the graph H k with the graph G k . The graph H k has additional vertices: these are the ones in Y k ∩ L 3 and the new edges in H k (new relative to G k ) belong to the following two classes:
). This is because every edge incident on X k ∩ L 2 in H k (these are all top-ranked edges) is present in G 0 as well.
Consider any new edge (a,
. Since (a, b) belongs to H k , it must be the case that a's most preferred neighbor in Y k is b. So the post b is ranked r a in a's list and a has no neighbor of rank better than r a in Y k . Recall that G 0 has no edge in nbr(L 3 ) × L 1 . So the only edge that can be incident on a in the graph G k is an edge to f (a) in
Consider any connected component C in G k that contains an s-post in L 2 : every post here belongs to either L 1 or Y k ∩ L 2 , in other words, there is no post in X k ∩ L 2 here. This is because there is no applicant a in G k with neighbors in Y k ∩ L 2 and X k ∩ L 2 as this means a has two neighbors in L 2 , which is forbidden in G 0 . Similarly, there is no applicant a in G k with neighbors in L 1 and X k ∩ L 2 as this means a has two neighbors in X k , which is forbidden in H k . Thus C has no post from X k ∩ L 2 .
So the new edges in H k of type (i) do not touch components in G k that contain s-posts in L 2 . All the new edges incident upon these components have their endpoints in L 1 ∪ (Y k ∩ L 2 ). These posts are already odd/unreachable in G k . So these posts remain odd/unreachable in H k . Hence every s-post in L 2 is odd/unreachable in H k .
The augmented graph G . The matching M * need not be A-complete. However it would help us to assume that M * is A-complete, so we augment M * by adding (a, (a) ) edges for every a ∈ A that is unmatched in M * . Recall that (a) is the dummy last resort post of a. However the augmented matching M * need not belong to the graph G any longer -hence we augment G also by adding some dummy vertices and some edges as described below.
The augmentation of G is analogous to phase (III) of our algorithm -we augment G as follows: then add (a, (a) ) to G . Thus when compared to G , the augmented G has some new vertices (all these are dummy last resort posts) and some new edges -each new edge is of the form (a, (a)) where (a) is a's only neighbor in L 2 ∪ L 3 . These new edges are enough to show the following lemma.
Lemma 8. The augmented matching M * belongs to the augmented graph G .
Proof. Before the augmentations of G and M * , the matching M * belonged to the graph G (by Lemma 6) . We now need to show that if a is left unmatched in M * (before augmentation), then r a = ∞ and all of a's neighbors belong to L 1 .
Suppose a is left unmatched in M * and r a < ∞. Since r a < ∞, there is a post b / ∈ F such that the post b has rank r a in a's preference list. Consider the alternating path p = a-b-a -f (a )-a , where a = M * (b) and a = M * (f (a )). The matching M * ⊕ p matches a to b and promotes a to its top post f (a ) and leaves a unmatched. Thus M * ⊕ p is more popular than M * , a contradiction.
So let us assume r a = ∞ and a was left unmatched in M * . Suppose a has some neighbor b 0 outside L 1 . The post b 0 has to be in F because r a = ∞, i.e. a has no neighbors outside F . Since
, then we again have an alternating path p = a-b 0 -a 0 -f (a 0 )-a 1 , where a 1 = M * (f (a 0 )) such that M * ⊕ p is more popular than M * . This contradicts the popularity of M * .
So suppose b 0 = f (a 0 ) and b 0 ∈ L 2 because a 0 ∈ nbr(L 3 ). We know from Claim 1 that there is a desired alternating path ρ a 0 , where either the last two non-matching edges are labeled +1 or the last post in ρ a 0 is unmatched. Consider the alternating path ρ which is the path a-b 0 -a 0 followed by the path ρ a 0 . It is easy to see that M * ⊕ ρ is more popular than M * , a contradiction to the popularity of M * .
Since the augmented M * is an A-complete matching, it follows from Lemma 8 that the augmented graph G admits an A-complete matching. Theorem 5 uses Lemma 7 to show that if the augmented graph G admits an A-complete matching, then so does the graph H constructed by our algorithm. Proof. We will use G to refer to the augmented graph G in this proof. The rules for adding edges in H and in G are exactly the same -the only difference is in the partition X, Y, Z on which
Fig . 5 . The part of G inside the box will be called G . The graph G has no edge between any applicant in A and any post in Z.
, then the graphs H and G are exactly the same. Fig. 5 denotes how the partition X, Y, Z can be modified to the partition L 1 , L 2 , L 3 . We know from Lemma 7 that X ⊇ L 1 and Z ⊆ L 3 . Consider the subgraph G of G induced on the vertex set A = (A \ nbr(Z)) ∪ (nbr(Z) ∩ nbr H (Y ∩ L 3 )) and B = X ∪ Y . This is the part bounded by the box in Fig. 5 . In our analysis, we can essentially separate G into G and the part outside G due to the following claim that says G has no edges between A and Z.
Claim 5 G has no edge (a, b) where a ∈ A and b ∈ Z.
Proof. Any applicant a ∈ A has to belong to either A \ nbr(Z) or to nbr(Z) ∩ nbr H (Y ∩ L 3 ) (see Fig. 5 ). There is obviously no edge in G between a vertex in A \ nbr(Z) and any vertex in
Thus G has no edge (a, b) where a ∈ A and b ∈ Z.
Since a ∈ nbr H (Y ∩ L 3 ), the graph H contains an edge between a and some b ∈ Y ∩ L 3 . Recall that an element of Y ∩ L 3 is a real post in Y . By the rules of including edges in H, it follows that the rank of b in a's preference list is ≤ r a . The entire set L 3 cannot contain any post of rank better than r a for any a ∈ A since any post of rank better than r a in a's list belongs to F while L 3 ∩ F = ∅ (by Lemma 5.1). So b has rank r a in a's list. Thus a's most preferred neighbor in
Let G 0 be the subgraph of G obtained by deleting from G the edges that are absent in H. Thus G 0 is a subgraph of both G and H. The following claim (whose proof is given after the proof of Theorem 5) will be useful to us.
Consider the graph G 1 whose edge set is the intersection of the edge sets of G and H. Equivalently, G 1 can be constructed by adding to the edge set of G 0 , the edges incident on A = nbr(Z) \ nbr H (Y ∩ L 3 ) that are present in both G and H (see Fig. 5 ). This is due to the fact that G has no edge in A × Z.
We claim that all posts in (X ∩ L 2 ) ∪ (Y ∩ L 3 ) are odd/unreachable in G 1 . This is because Claim 6 tells us that each post in this set is odd/unreachable in G 0 and due to the absence of A × Z edges in G , the graph G 1 has no new edge (new when compared to G 0 ) incident on the set A of applicants in
Claim 6 also tells us that all edges in G that are missing in H are incident on posts in (X ∩L 2 )∪ (Y ∩ L 3 ). We know that all these posts are odd/unreachable in G 1 , hence G has no new edge (new when compared to G 1 ) on posts that are even in G 1 . Thus the size of a maximum matching in G equals the size of a maximum matching in G 1 . This is at most the size of a maximum matching in H, since G 1 is a subgraph of H. Hence if H has no A-complete matching, then neither does G .
Proof of Claim 6. We will now show that all posts in (X ∩ L 2 ) ∪ (Y ∩ L 3 ) are odd/unreachable in G 0 . Let a be an applicant with degree 2 in the graph G 0 , let b 1 and b 2 be the two neighbors of a, where b 1 is the more preferred neighbor of a. We claim either
. This is because of the following.
-There is no applicant in G 0 with edges to both a post in L 1 and post in X ∩ L 2 . If there was such an applicant a, then a would have two neighbors in the set X, which is forbidden in H.
Recall that any edge in G 0 is an edge in H as well. -There is no applicant in G 0 with edges to both a post in X ∩ L 2 and a post in Y ∩ L 2 . If there was such an applicant a, then a would have two neighbors in the set L 2 , which is forbidden in G . Recall that any edge in G 0 is an edge in G as well. -There is no applicant in G 0 with edges to both a post in Y ∩ L 2 and a post in Y ∩ L 3 . If there was such an applicant a, then a would have two neighbors in the set Y , which is forbidden in H. -There is no applicant a in G 0 with edges to both a post in L 1 and a post in Y ∩ L 3 . This is because G cannot contain such a pair of edges as it is only applicants in A \ nbr(L 3 ) that are adjacent to posts in L 1 . We will now show the second part of Claim 6: every edge (a,
Thus in the graph
. We partitioned the set B of posts into five sets (refer to Fig. 5 ).
and Z. We will now show that every edge in G that is incident on
, this means a ∈ A \ nbr(Z). Thus H also contains the edge (a, b). 
Theorem 5, along with Lemma 8, finishes the proof of the necessary part of Theorem 4 and this completes the proof of correctness of our algorithm. We now analyze its running time.
Observe that we can maintain the most preferred posts in X, Y , and Z for all applicants over all iterations in O(m) time, where m is the number of edges in G. To begin with, the most preferred non-f -post for all applicants can be determined in O(m) time. Thereafter, whenever a post b moves from X to Y (similarly, from Y to Z), we charge b a cost of the degree of b to pay for checking if any of its neighbors now has b as its most preferred post in Y (resp., Z).
Let n be the number of vertices in G. The number of iterations is O(n) and the most expensive step in each iteration is finding a maximum matching in a subgraph where each vertex in A has degree at most 2. It is easy to see that this step can be performed in O(n) time. Thus the running time of our algorithm is O(n 2 ). Hence we can conclude Theorem 1 stated in Section 1.
There are instances on O(n) vertices and O(n) edges where our algorithm takes Θ(n 2 ) time. Consider the example given in Fig. 6 : here there are 2n + 1 applicants and 2n + 2 posts and the number of edges is 5n+2. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have f (a i ) = f (a i ) = f i and s i is the most preferred non-f -post for both a i and a i . For a 0 , we have f (a 0 ) = f 0 and a 0 's most preferred non-f -post is s 0 . Fig. 6 . The preferences of applicants are indicated on the edges. Our algorithm runs for n + 1 iterations here.
In the starting graph H 1 , there is exactly one post that is even in Y 1 : this is s 0 and so s 0 moves from Y 1 to Z 1 . In the second iteration, f 0 has no applicant in A \ nbr(Z) that regards it as a top post and this causes the demotion of f 0 from X 2 to Y 2 . Now the post f 0 is the most preferred post in Y 2 for a 1 and this makes s 1 even in Y 2 and causes s 1 to move from Y 2 to Z 2 .
This makes both a 1 and a 1 belong to nbr(Z) and hence f 1 gets isolated in H 3 and so f 1 moves from X 3 to Y 3 . Now f 1 becomes the most preferred post in Y 3 for a 2 and this causes s 2 to move from Y 3 to Z 3 and so on. Thus our algorithm runs for n + 1 iterations. This instance admits popular matchings, for instance, {(a 0 , f 0 ), (a i , f i ), (a i , s i ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} is a popular matching here.
Our NP-hardness result
Given a matching M in G = (A ∪ B, E), it was shown in [3] that M can be tested for popularity in O( |V |·|E|) time (even in the presence of ties), where |V | = |A∪B|. We now show the NP-hardness of the 2-sided popular matching problem in G with 1-sided ties using the (2,2)-e3-sat problem.
Recall that the (2,2)-e3-sat problem takes as its input a Boolean formula I in CNF, where each clause contains three literals and every variable appears exactly twice in unnegated form and exactly twice in negated form in the clauses. The problem is to determine if I is satisfiable or not and this problem is NP-complete [2] .
Constructing a popular matching instance G = (A ∪ B, E) from I. Let I have m clauses and n variables. The instance G constructed consists of n variable gadgets, m clause gadgets, and some interconnecting edges between these, see Fig. 7 . A variable gadget representing variable v j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, is a 4-cycle on vertices a j 1 , b j 1 , a j 2 , and b j 2 , where a j 1 , a j 2 ∈ A and b j 1 , b j 2 ∈ B. A clause gadget representing clause C i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is a subdivision graph of a claw. Its edges are divided into three classes: c i ∈ B is at the center, the neighbors of c i are x i 1 , x i 2 , x i 3 ∈ A, and finally, each of x i 1 , x i 2 , x i 3 is adjacent to its respective copy in
A vertex in Y i represents an appearance of a variable. For instance, y 3 1 is the first literal of the third clause. Each of the vertices in Y i is connected to a vertex in the variable gadget via an interconnecting edge. Vertex y i k is connected to the gadget standing for variable j if the k-th literal of the ith clause is either v j or ¬v j . If it is v j , then the interconnecting edge ends at a j 1 , else at a j 2 . The preferences of this instance can be seen in Fig. 7 . The constructed graph trivially satisfies both conditions claimed in Section 1, i.e. every vertex in A has a strict preference list of length 2 or 4 and every vertex in B has either a strict preference list of length 2 or a single tie of length 2 or 3 as a preference list. Constructing a truth assignment in I, given a popular matching M in G. The graph G is as described above. Claim 7 states that any popular matching M in G has a certain structure.
Claim 7 Any popular matching M in G has to obey the following properties.
-M avoids all interconnecting edges.
-M is one of the two perfect matchings on any variable gadget; i.e. for each j, the edges of M , restricted to the gadget corresponding to variable v j , are either (i) (a j 1 , b j 1 ) and (a j 2 , b j 2 ), or (ii) (a j 1 , b j 2 ) and (a j 2 , b j 1 ).
-M leaves exactly one vertex per clause i unmatched and this unmatched vertex y i k is adjacent to an a jt that is matched to b j 1 .
Proof. Label each edge (a, b) in G \ M by the pair (α, β), where α ∈ {±1} is a's vote for b versus M (a) and β ∈ {±1, 0} is b's vote for a versus M (b). Our first observation is that every c i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and every b j 1 , for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, must be matched in M . That is because these vertices are the top choices for each of their neighbors, hence if one of them is left unmatched, then there would be an edge labeled (+1, +1) incident to an unmatched vertex. This contradicts the popularity of M . Assume without loss of generality that {(c i , x i 3 ), (a j 1 , b j 1 )} ⊆ M . Also, the edges (x i 1 , y i 1 ) and (x i 2 , y i 2 ) must be in M , because they are the top-ranked edges of y i 1 and y i 2 , respectively. We now claim that (a j 2 , b j 2 ) ∈ M as well.
Suppose (a j 2 , b j 2 ) / ∈ M . Since M is a maximal matching, (a j 2 , y i k ) ∈ M for some i k . Based on the above described structure of the clause gadgets, the edges (x j k , c j ), (x j k+1 , y j k+1 ), and (x j k+2 , y j k+2 ) are in M , where the subscripts are taken modulo 3. Consider the following augmenting path p wrt M :
We have M ⊕ p M , which contradicts the popularity of M . Thus (a j 2 , b j 2 ) ∈ M . An analogous argument proves that if (a j 2 , b j 1 ) ∈ M for some j, then (a j 1 , b j 2 ) has to be in M . The last observation we make is that if y i k is unmatched in M , then its interconnecting edge leads to an a jt that is matched to b j 1 . Otherwise (y i k , a jt ) would be labeled (+1, +1) with one vertex unmatched, a contradiction again to the popularity of M . This finishes the proof of Claim 7.
We assign true to all variables v j such that M ⊇ {(a j 1 , b j 1 ), (a j 2 , b j 2 )} and false to all variables v j such that M ⊇ {(a j 1 , b j 2 ), (a j 2 , b j 1 )}.
So the truth value of every variable is uniquely defined and all we need to show is that every clause has a true literal. Assume that in clause C i , all three literals are false. The clause gadget has an unmatched vertex y i k that is adjacent to an a jt . If the literal is false, then a jt prefers y i k to M (a jt ) = b j 2 and this becomes an edge labeled (+1, +1) with an unmatched end vertex -this contradicts the popularity of M . Hence in every clause, there is at least one true literal and so this is a satisfying assignment.
Constructing a popular matching in G, given a truth assignment in I. Here we first construct a matching M in the graph G as described below and then show that it is popular. Initially M = ∅. For each j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ n, if v j = true in the assignment, then add (a j 1 , b j 1 ) and (a j 2 , b j 2 ) to M , else add (a j 1 , b j 2 ) and (a j 2 , b j 1 ) to M . For each i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, in the gadget corresponding to clause C i , any true literal is chosen (say, the k-th literal) and y i k , representing its appearance, is left unmatched. Moreover, (x i k , c i ), (x i k+1 , y i k+1 ) and (x i k+2 , y i k+2 ) (where the subscripts are taken modulo 3) are added to M . No interconnecting edge appears in M . This finishes the description of M .
Claim 8
The matching M is popular in G.
Proof. Suppose M is not popular. Then there is another matching M that is more popular than M . This can only happen if M ⊕ M contains a component ρ such that the number of vertices in ρ that prefer M to M is more than those that prefer M to M . To achieve this, the matching M should contain at least one edge labeled either (+1, +1) or (+1, 0), where we use edge labels (α, β) as described in the proof of Claim 7. We now analyze the cases based on the occurrences of such "positive" edges.
Since we started with a truth assignment, no interconnecting edge can be labeled (+1, +1). In fact, it is easy to check that no edge here can be labeled (+1, +1). We now check for the occurrences of edges labeled (+1, 0). These can occur at two places: the edge (a jt , b j 1 ) for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n and the edge (x i k , c i ) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Case 1. Suppose (a j 2 , b j 1 ) is labeled (+1, 0) . This happens if v j is true in the truth assignment. We start the augmenting path ρ at (a j 2 , b j 1 ). Augmenting along the 4-cycle is not sufficient to break popularity, therefore, a j 1 must be matched along one of its interconnecting edges, say (a j 1 , y i k ).
-If y i k is unmatched, consider the path ρ = b j 2 -a j 2 -b j 1 -a j 1 -y i k . There are two vertices (a j 1 and b j 2 ) that prefer M to M ⊕ ρ and two vertices (a j 2 and y i k ) that prefer M ⊕ ρ to M . -If y i k is matched, then extend the path ρ till the unmatched vertex of the ith variable gadget (call this y it ). The path ρ is described below:
So 4 vertices, i.e. b j 2 , a j 1 , y i k , and x it , prefer M to M ⊕ ρ while 3 vertices, i.e. a j 2 , x i k , and y it , prefer M ⊕ ρ to M .
Case 2. Now suppose (x i k , c i ) is labeled (+1, 0). Let us assume that this edge is (x i 3 , c i ) and suppose (x i 1 , c i ) ∈ M . Consider the alternating path ρ = y i 1 -x i 1 -c i -x i 3 -y i 3 . In the matching M ⊕ ρ, the vertices x i 3 and y i 1 are better-off while x i 1 and y i 3 are worse-off, i.e. they prefer M to M ⊕ ρ. In order to collect one more vertex that prefers M ⊕ ρ, let us extend this alternating path ρ to include (a j k , y i 3 ), the interconnecting edge of y i 3 . The vertex y i 3 still prefers M to M ⊕ ρ since y i 3 was paired in M to its top-ranked neighbor. Without loss of generality, let us assume that this interconnecting edge is (a j 2 , y i 3 ). We have two cases here: either {(a j 1 , b j 1 ), (a j 2 , b j 2 )} ⊆ M or {(a j 1 , b j 2 ), (a j 2 , b j 1 )} ⊆ M .
-In the first case, the path ρ gets extended to · · · -a j 2 -b j 2 . So a j 2 prefers M ⊕ ρ to M , however b j 2 is left unmatched in M ⊕ ρ, so b j 2 prefers M to M ⊕ ρ. -In the second case, the path ρ gets extended to · · · -a j 2 -b j 1 -a j 1 -b j 2 . So a j 1 prefers M ⊕ ρ to M , however both a j 2 and b j 2 prefer M to M ⊕ ρ.
We have analyzed all the cases where edges can labeled (+1, 0) and we showed that there is no alternating cycle or path ρ containing an edge labeled (+1, 0) such that M ⊕ ρ M . Thus M is popular.
This finishes the proof of Theorem 2 stated in Section 1.
Conclusions and open problems. We gave an O(n 2 ) algorithm for the popular matching problem in G = (A∪B, E) where vertices in A have strict preference lists while each vertex in B puts all its neighbors into a single tie and n = |A ∪ B|. Our algorithm needs the preference lists of vertices in A to be strict and the complexity of the popular matching problem when ties are allowed in the preference lists of vertices in A is currently unknown.
When each b ∈ B either has a single tie of length at most 3 or a strict preference list (and each a ∈ A has a strict preference list), we showed that the popular matching problem becomes NP-hard. The complexity of the same problem with ties of length at most 2 
